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The main goal of this paper is to broaden our perception of North Korea s
nuclear weapons program beyond military, economic, and political-diplomatic
aspects and to propose a view of the program as a dynamic identity project of
and for the North Korean state. Drawing on a poststructuralist approach that
theorizes the state as performatively constituted and foreign policy as a polit-
ical performance central to the production of identity, this paper analyzes
North Korea s evolving nuclear state identity on two levels. Firstly, it scruti-
nizes the discursive construction of this particular identity trait, identifying both
the process of exploration as well as the central contextual characteristics of
this particular identity trait. Building on these deliberations, the study, sec-
ondly, analyzes the performative enactment of this identity construction by
scrutinizing some of those iterated foreign policy performances that bring the
constructed nuclear state identity into being. As its central argument, the
paper holds that to P yongyang, the nuclear weapons program has signifi-
cance well beyond its military, economic, and political-diplomatic aspects; it
has become the most crucial identity project of the North Korean state in the
post-Cold War era, ultimately resulting in the emergence of an authoritative
nuclear state identity that is still in the process of being explored. This view
opens a new perspective on the ongoing nuclear conflict with the internation-
al community as a vital performative space in which the DPRK stages its iden-
tity politics and continuously explores its identity as a nuclear weapons state.
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hile the Democratic People s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea)
has long denied developing nuclear weapons, the last decade saw a rapid
transformation of the DPRK into a de facto nuclear weapons state. Following its
W
˘
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first public declaration of being a nuclear power in 2005, North Korea tested
nuclear devices in 2006, 2009,  2013, and twice in 2016, respectively. Moreover,
in 2012 the DPRK amended its constitution, adding a reference to the DPRK as a
nuclear state (haekpoyuguk) in the preamble. Given its potential impact on the
East Asian region and beyond, it is hardly surprising that the DPRK s nuclear
breakout has also attracted the attention of International Relations (IR) and
Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) scholars. While the theoretical debate in this con-
text has been dominated by materialist and positivist approaches such as (neo-
)realism and (neo-)liberalism (e.g. Cha and Kang 2003; Ballbach 2013), a num-
ber of scholars have more recently turned towards post-positivist approaches to
help better understand North Korea s motives and behaviors in the nuclear
issue (e.g. Kim 2009; Hymans 2008; Pollack 2011). This has broadened the the-
oretical debate beyond the standard positivist assumption of the North Korean
leadership s nuclear intentions as solely based on cost-benefit calculations, a
measured internal response to the external environment. Instead, drawing on
constructivist approaches, these authors strongly suggest the importance of mov-
ing beyond materialist explanations, arguing that P yongyang s decision to go
nuclear is instead driven by norms, worldviews, identities and emotions.
However, while constructivist authors draw the right conclusion that North
Korea views nuclear weapons as central to its identity (Pollack 2011, 207), there
are problems linked to this approach if viewed from the poststructuralist per-
spective adopted in this study. Above all, Wendtian constructivism acts on the
assumption of pre-given identities, therefore disregarding their discursive nature
and the performative-constitutive relationship to foreign policy.1 As such, impor-
tant questions regarding the link between North Korea s nuclear endeavor and
the state s identity and foreign policy remain underexplored. Against this back-
ground, this study analyzes North Korea s avowed nuclear state identity on two
levels. Building on previous research on North Korea s nuclear discourse
(Ballbach 2014; 2015), it firstly scrutinizes the discursive construction of this par-
1 For example, Hymans (2006, 205) treats the DPRK s decision to pursue nuclear weapons as a
causal effect of its oppositional-nationalist identity conception, which thus constitutes the inde-
pendent variable. Also problematic is Hyman s tendency to reduce his understanding of identities to
the level of emotions and his juxtaposition of emotional decision-making vs. strategic considera-
tions. From a poststructuralist view, however, the discursive construction of identities may well
encompass both emotional and strategic considerations. Ultimately, conventional constructivists
misjudge the DPRK s nuclear weapons program as a tool that simply counters the fear (e.g. from
nuclear attacks by the U.S.), thereby discounting the political functions of danger and the basic post-
structuralist assumption that fear and danger are a condition of a state s very being.
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ticular identity trait, assessing both the process of exploration and development
as well as its central contextual characteristics. Theorizing the state as performa-
tively constituted and foreign policy as a political performance central to the pro-
duction of identity, the study, secondly, analyzes the performative enactment of
this identity trait by scrutinizing some of those iterated foreign policy perfor-
mances that bring the constructed nuclear state identity into being.
The resulting argument is fairly simple: To P yongyang, the nuclear weapons
program has significance well beyond its military, economic, and political-diplo-
matic aspects; it has become the most crucial identity project of the North Korean
state in the post-Cold War era, ultimately resulting in the emergence of an author-
itative nuclear state identity that is still in the process of being explored. As such,
the ongoing nuclear conflict with the international community provides a signif-
icant performative space in which the DPRK performs its politics of identity and
continuously explores and (re-)assures its identity as a nuclear weapons state. 
THEORETICAL DISCUSSIOIN: 
PERFORMATIVITY, THE STATE AND THE FOREIGN POLICY/
IDENTITY NEXUS
ON THE CONCEPT OF PERFORMATIVITY
Performativity is an interdisciplinary term that is widely used to discuss the
capacity of language and gestures to act or consummate an action, or to construct
and perform an identity. Most authors working with the concept (e.g. Konig 2011,
45; Loxley 2007, 1; Volbers 2011, 144) trace its origins to linguistic philosopher
John L. Austin. In his pathbreaking book How To Do Things With Words
(1962) Austin used the term performative utterances to describe situations in
which saying something is doing something, rather than simply reporting on or
describing reality. Performative utterances thus simultaneously enforce that
what they convey [and thereby] change reality according to the uttered words
(Konig 2011, 46). As Austin (1962, 60, emphasis in original) himself famously
stated: There is something which is at the moment of uttering being done by the
person uttering. Austin thus put forth the valuable idea that, in the context of
(formal or informal) societal institutions, language, or more precisely, a specific
form of speech act, has the power to constitute (a new) reality (Konig 2011, 47).
Starting from these basic considerations in the context of linguistic philosophy,
the conceptual debate on performativity spread to a number of further disci-
plines, ultimately developing into what Uwe Wirth (2002, 10) has described as an
umbrella term not only in the field of cultural studies.
Within the social sciences, the concept of performativity was particularly made
prominent by Judith Butler (1990; 1993). From a theoretical perspective, Butler s
rendering of the concept is crucial, for she contests the notion of a gender-fixed
identity and explains how identity is located not in the body, but within the acts
that individuals perform and repeat in their social context. Butler therefore
locates the performative in the repeated, public and active performance
(Auffuhrung) and staging (Inszenierung) of gender (Volbers 2011, 145). This
reflects a crucial expansion of the concept of performativity, which, in Butler s
discussion, does not describe a characterization of speech acts, but a constitutive
component of social praxis. This perspective takes into account specific social cat-
egories and attributions as products and effects of performative staging practices
(Auffuhrungspraxis), which constitutes a renewed and stabilizing re-inscription
of those particular cultural codes that are manifested by those practices. The main
point here is that the performative act-be it textual or material-unfolds an inde-
pendent effect (Volbers 2011, 146). The idea that the gendered identity of the body
is performatively constituted therefore implies an understanding of the concept
as something executed as opposed to something merely possessed. Rejecting
the idea of the body as a pre-existing, blank slate devoid of value on which gen-
der is inscribed, Butler (1990, 136) argues that the gendered identity of the body
has no ontological status apart from the various acts which constitute its reali-
ty. The implications of this assumption for the further discussion in this study
are crucial, for that Butler rejects the assumption of gender as a stable identity
and instead understands gender as
an identity tenuously constituted in time, instituted in an exterior space through
a stylized repetition of acts ; an identity achieved not [through] a founding act,
but rather a regulated process of repetition (Butler 1990, 136, 140-141, 145, ital-
ics in original). 
Put differently, performances of identity become meaningful and asserting only
to the extent that they are repeated(ly performed) (Butler 1993, 12), and perfor-
mativity thus becomes the power of discourse to produce effects through reiter-
ation (Butler 1993, 20). This visibly demarks the concept of performativity from
that of the performance. As Searle (1989, 536, emphasis in original) aptly puts it:
though every utterance is indeed a performance, only a very restricted class are
performatives. For instance, a North Korean official giving a general statement
on North Korea s nuclear strategy may be an element of the state s nuclear dis-
course and the speech itself may constitute a political performance, but it is not
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performative as long as there are no manifest political consequences and prac-
tices linked to it that create a new reality.
THE STATE AND THE FOREIGN POLICY/IDENTITY NEXUS
A number of critical IR/FPA scholars have linked Butler s performative concep-
tion of gender to the subject of the sovereign nation-state. Arguing that the (iden-
tity of the) state can be similarly conceptualized than any other subject, these
(mostly poststructuralist) authors postulate that sovereign nation-states are not
essentialized, pre-given subjects, but subjects in process and as such are the
ontological effect of practices which are performatively enacted (Weber 1998,
78). As David Campbell (1998, 9-13) puts it in reference to Judith Butler, in this
formulation the state has no natural or self-evident ontological status or founda-
tion and, thus, no (pre-discursive) identity prior to or apart from the ensemble of
spatial and temporal (disciplinary and exclusionary) enframing practices which
establish identity and fix difference and hence bring the state into being. The
state, understood as a discursively produced structural/structuring effect, thus
relies on constant acts of performativity, on a set of state-making practices to pro-
duce the effect of the state. As such, what we conceive of as the state is neither
simply present nor is it ever finished as an entity, but it is (and has to be) always
in a process of becoming, in the process of being constituted (Devetak 1995, 32;
Weber 1998, 78). National states must be permanently reproduced, as suspend-
ing its practices of representation would mean to expose its lack of pre-discur-
sive foundations; stasis would be death (Campbell 1998, 12). 
This understanding of the state as performatively constituted leads to a partic-
ular view on the nature of foreign policy. Rejecting the conventional taken-for-
granted assumption of foreign policy as internally mediated responses of (pre-
given) states oriented toward the external world, poststructuralists understand
foreign policy as the means through which a particular mode of subjectivity is
(re-)produced (Campbell 1998, x; see also Laffey 2000). As a vital political prac-
tice that contributes to the making of the state by differentiating it from others
and making foreign certain actors and events, foreign policy constitutes a
boundary-producing political performance central to the (re-)production of
the state and identity in whose name it operates (Ashley 1987; Campbell 1998).
At this point, the close link between foreign policy and identity suggested by
poststructuralists becomes evident. Identity, from a poststructuralist view, is a
representational practice through which certain articulations of foreign policies
are made possible to begin with (i.e.performances of Self and Other). At the same
time, these foreign policies simultaneously reassure the identity at stake
(Bormann 2008, 6). In this formulation, identity and foreign policy thus do not
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have a causal effect on each other, but are linked in a constitutive and performa-
tive relationship (e.g. Hansen 2011, 177). Because identities do not exist in a pre-
discursive realm and, thus, have no existence independently of the foreign poli-
cies that produce them, identity cannot be conceptualized in rationalist episte-
mological terms as an independent variable against which to measure (foreign
policy) behavior (Hansen 2006, 27): neither do identities cause foreign policies,
nor do foreign policies cause identities. Rather, identities are both a product of
and a justification for foreign policies. This is to argue that while decision-mak-
ers have recourse to certain identities or material interests in their representa-
tions of foreign policy, it is also through their formulation of foreign policy that
ideas, identities, and material interests are produced and reproduced (Hansen
2006, 1). 
THE DISCURSIVE CONSTRUCTION OF A NUCLEAR STATE
IDENTITY IN NORTH KOREA
North Korea s nuclear state identity is constructed in and expressed through a set
of particular domestic and foreign political (as well as cultural and social) dis-
courses, more prominent examples being the discourse of the Diplomatic War
(Ballbach 2014; 2015) or the Military-First discourse (Jeon 2009). Given the
totalitarian structure of the DPRK s political system, it is hardly overstated to
describe these discourses as highly hegemonic. To paraphrase Michel Foucault,
they are a result and expression of North Korea s totalitarian power conditions
(Herrschaftszustande), in which power relations are rigid and blocked, alterna-
tive opportunities for actions and ranges for free choice are heavily restricted, and
a durable asymmetry is established. However, this fact does not discard the value
of analyzing North Korean discourses. On the contrary, it reaffirms the necessity
to do so, as it is within these discourses that such identity traits as the nuclear
state identity are constructed. This section first provides an overview of the emer-
gence and development of the nuclear state identity construction within North
Korea s post-Cold War political discourse, and, secondly, discusses two main
characteristics of this discursive construction, namely, the writing of Self and
Other, and the constructions of threat and danger. 
EMERGENCE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE NUCLEAR STATE IDENTITY
CONSTRUCTION
While the history of North Korea s nuclear endeavors reaches back to the 1950s,
the emergence of the nuclear state identity is innately linked to the challenges of
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the post-Cold War era; a time in which the very self-conception of the DPRK as a
strong and autonomous state had to be reassured. The construction of a nuclear
state identity was a vital element of this reassurance project. In this context, the
self-proclaimed status as a nuclear power has, in a relatively short period of time,
become a vital, if not the most important element of North Korea s post-Cold War
state identity - one with significant political consequences. As will be discussed in
this section, however, this particular identity trait was all but fixed following the
emergence of a first international crisis over North Korea s nuclear weapons pro-
gram in the early 1990s. Rather, it gradually evolved ever since and it is still in the
process of being explored. 
THE EMERGENCCE OF A NUCLEAR STATE IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION
All throughout the 1990s and the early 2000s, North Korea continuously assert-
ed not to possess and, in fact, not striving to possess nuclear weapons, linking its
nuclear program directly to the country s pressing energy needs. The Iraq War in
2003 not only constituted a turning point in the DPRK s overall foreign policy
and security strategy, but also had a profound influence on the construction of its
post-Cold War state identity. It was in this context that North Korean texts first
claimed that P yongyang has the natural right to produce nuclear weapons in
order to protect the state and nation against what is described as the hostile U.S.
policy aimed at stifling the DPRK (e.g. Institute for the Reunification of the
Fatherland 2003; see also Chun 2004; Kim 2014). Similarly, a KCNA report held
that the key lesson drawn by the DPRK from the Iraq War was that [o]nly
tremendous military deterrent force, powerful enough to decisively beat back an
attack supported by any ultra-modern weapons, can avert a war and protect the
security of the country and the nation (KCNA 2003a). While this formulation
constituted a visible departure from the previous line of reasoning, both North
Korean politicians and media texts followed the official policy line, which has
been to neither confirm nor deny any accusations about the status of its nuclear
program. This resulted in conflicting statements regarding the status of the
DPRK s nuclear weapons program between 2003 and 2005. While a senior rep-
resentative of the DPRK s foreign ministry allegedly claimed in 2003 that North
Korea would already possess nuclear weapons (Washington Post 2003; KCNA
2003b), it was only in February 2005 that North Korea publically declared to
have successfully developed nuclear weapons, its rhetoric now alluding from
building to bolstering its nuclear deterrent (Hayes and Bruce 2011). 
THE NUCLEAR BREAKOUT
The first nuclear test in October 2006 was a significant turning point in the
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DPRK s construction of a nuclear state identity and the subsequent modes of rep-
resentations used to reframe itself in terms of a nuclear weapons state. A state-
ment issued by the DPRK s Foreign Ministry (KCNA 2006a) shortly before the
first nuclear test provides a good example of how the leadership in P yongyang
now began to more comprehensively explore its identity in terms of a nuclear
weapons state, while at the same time using those discursive patterns to legit-
imize its nuclear endeavor. Engaging both the domestic audience and the interna-
tional community, the text particularly stresses the victimhood/defense dualism.
That is, it emphasizes the intimate link between the vulnerability of the DPRK as
a victim and target of U.S. threat, and an understanding of its nuclear weapons
program as an indispensable protection racket for North Korea s sovereignty
and security. In other words, North Korea s nuclear state identity presupposes
that its sovereignty is supremely threatened and that the nuclear weapons pro-
gram constitutes a legitimate (defensive) measure to protect not only the securi-
ty of the DPRK, but peace and stability of the whole region.
A people without reliable war deterrent are bound to meet a tragic death and the
sovereignty of their country is bound to be wantonly infringed upon. (...) The
DPRK s nuclear weapons will serve as reliable war deterrent for protecting the
supreme interests of the state and the security of the Korean nation from the U.S.
threat of aggression and averting a new war and firmly safeguarding peace and
stability on the Korean peninsula under any circumstances. The DPRK will always
sincerely implement its international commitment in the field of nuclear non-pro-
liferation as a responsible nuclear weapons state (Ibid.). 
As the previous statement explicates, the narratives of victimhood/threat and the
narrative of defense are paralleled by an attempted to project an image of the
DPRK as a responsible nuclear weapons state, a state that possesses this weapon
legitimately and abides by international non-proliferation obligations. To that
end, the text both ensures that its nuclear tests are conducted under the condi-
tion where safety is firmly guaranteed, and that the DPRK will never use
nuclear weapons first [and] strictly prohibit any threat of nuclear weapons and
nuclear transfer (Ibid.). 
The successful nuclear test in the DPRK was an exercise of its independent and
legitimate right as a sovereign state as it was a positive defensive countermeasure
to protect the sovereignty, life and security of the people from the escalated threat
of nuclear war and pressure from the US. The DPRK was compelled to legiti-
mately pull out of the NPT as a result of its relevant provision and manufacturing
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of nuclear weapons after undergoing the most fair transparent processes, as the
US seriously encroached upon the supreme security of the DPRK and the funda-
mental interests of the Korean nation under the pretext of the nuclear issue
(KCNA 2006c). 
Following the October 2006 nuclear test, North Korean texts emphasized the
importance of the nuclear status ever more. Not only did the nuclear test reassure
the DPRK s self-perception as a militarily strong state, the possession of nuclear
weapons was now designated a unique event in national history. For example, in
the New Year s special editorial on January 1, 2007, North Korea s emerging
nuclear state identity was constructed by emphasizing national history and
national strength, arguing that the possession of nuclear weapons constitutes
an auspicious event in our national history, and a realization of our people s
centuries-long desire to have a national strength no one could dare challenge
(Rodong Sinmun 2007, quoted in Nam 2012, 186). However, at this particular
stage of development the texts also repeatedly emphasize that the ultimate goal
of the DPRK would remain the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, thus
still leaving considerable room for political maneuvering.
CONSTRUCTING EXCEPTIONALISM
While the scripting of the nuclear discourse before 2006 (and maybe even until
2008) suggests that it was still possible to reverse the DPRK s full nuclear break-
out, in the critical few years since 2008 the identity of the top leadership in North
Korea was fused with the image of a strong nuclear state (Hayes and Bruce 2011)
in the country s internal and external propaganda. During this particular period,
North Korea significantly altered the rendering of its nuclear status, which now
(at least officially) was decoupled from its relations to the U.S. (Ibid.).
Accentuating this reversal of strategy, a DPRK spokesman explained that even if
the diplomatic relations between the two countries would be normalized, the
DPRK s status as a nuclear weapons state will remain unchanged as long as it is
exposed even to the slightest U.S. nuclear threat (KCNA 2009). He further
opined that [i]t is the reality on the Korean Peninsula that we can live without
normalizing the relations with the U.S. but not without nuclear deterrent (Ibid.).
While P yongyang still attempted to project an image of the DPRK as a respon-
sible nuclear weapons state, it now also increasingly emphasized the DPRK s role
as an exceptional one among nuclear weapons states. This dual representation is
the essence of its Nuclear Posture statement, issued in April 2010 (KCNA
2010). While reaffirming its promise to be a responsible nuclear power, the mem-
orandum explicitly states that the DPRK is not bound by the Non-Proliferation
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Treaty (NPT) and by international law. As Hayes and Bruce (2011) aptly point out,
North Korea now did no longer to seek to obtain international recognition and
legitimacy by stressing to use this capacity only for deterrence and by reassuring
its neighbors and the nuclear weapons states in the region. Rather, a close read-
ing of the DPRK s nuclear discourse suggests that it became a source of pride to
those in power to stress that the DPRK stands outside all legal frameworks gov-
erning nuclear weapons, simultaneously emphasizing its autonomy and attribut-
ing a self-declared nuclear outlaw status to itself (Hayes 2012). As a DPRK
Foreign Ministry spokesperson stated, North Korea does not want anybody to
recognize it as a nuclear weapons state nor feels any need to be done so. It is just
satisfied with the pride and self-esteem that it is capable of reliably defending the
sovereignty of the country and the security of the nation with its own nuclear
weapons (Korean Central Broadcasting Station, May 24, 2010, quoted in Hayes
and Bruce 2011). Similarly, a statement issued by the powerful National Defence
Commission (NDC) claims that the DPRK s status as a nuclear power would not
depend on whether others recognize it or not (KCNA 2013e). 
THE NUCLEAR STATE IDENTITY AND THE LEGACY OF KIM JONG IL
Just after his death in late 2011, the Rodong Sinmun (2011) issued the essay On
the Revolutionary Legacy of Kim Jong Il, which holds that North Korea had been
dignified as a nuclear power thanks only to the deceased supreme leader. The
essay not only links North Korea s nuclear weapons status to the historical revo-
lutionary struggle of the state and its people, but it evidently designates the sta-
tus as a nuclear weapons state as Kim Jong Il s single most important achieve-
ment. During the 5th Session of the 12th Supreme People s Assembly (SPA) in 2012,
North Korea amended its constitution, thereby constitutionally codifying its self-
proclaimed status as a nuclear weapons state. The new preamble asserts that Kim
Jong Il turned the DPRK into a politically and ideologically powerful state that
is invincible, a nuclear state [haekpoyuguk], and a militarily powerful state that
is indomitable; and paved a brilliant main road in building a powerful state
[kangsonggukka]. In this construction, Kim Jong Il s legacy became fused with
the status as a nuclear weapons state. In fact, in North Korea s contemporary
political discourses it is only Kim Il Sung s anti-Japanese struggle that occupies
a more important place in North Korea s national history (e.g., KCNA 2013a).
This equation, therefore, has important political ramifications, as it suggests that
the road to denuclearize the DPRK will be a long, slow, and potentially costly one.
This is because a complete rejection of the nuclear weapons state status bears the
risk of being interpreted as questioning (the legacy of) Kim Jong Il. Against this
background, it seems increasingly unlikely that the nuclear weapons status is up
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for negotiations any more - or at least that the price would be very high. As is stat-
ed in an editorial of the Rodong Sinmun, [i]f the D.P.R.K. sits at a table with the
U.S., it has to be a dialogue between nuclear weapon states, not one side forcing
the other to dismantle nuclear weapons (KCNA 2013b). This assessment can
also be identified in one of the most prolific texts produced in this recent stage of
the development of the nuclear state identity: the article Nuke and Peace
[haekkwa p yonghwa], originally published in the Rodong Sinmun (2013; see
also KCNA 2013c, 2013d). The editorial represents an authoritative text on North
Korea s nuclear politics and shows how state ideology and identity relates to these
policies. The underlying message of the text is unambiguous: North Korea is now
a nuclear state, a unique member of the nuclear club whose nuclear status is non-
negotiable. Additionally, the text also touches upon the altered (self-proclaimed)
status of the DPRK on the international stage now that it is in possession of
nuclear weapons, once again positioning itself as a leader of smaller nations that
equally faces the threat of big powers. While North Korea s leadership has sought
such a role for itself as early as the 1960s, it now seems to become once again
important to the state s self-image at home (Hayes and Bruce 2011). 
THE MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF THE NUCLEAR STATE IDENTITY
CONSTRUCTION
As any identity construction, North Korea s nuclear state identity is highly com-
plex. While any debate of the characteristics of this particular identity trait thus
remains necessarily incomplete, it is very well possible to identify some of the
basic characteristics of this discursive construction. In the following section, two
particularly important discursive characteristics of the nuclear state identity are
addressed: the writing of Self and Other, and the construction of threats and dan-
gers.2
THE NUCLEAR STATE IDENTITY AND THE WRITING OF SELF AND
OTHER
According to poststructuralists, identity is established in relation to a series of
socially recognized differences that are essential to its being (Connolly 1991, 64).
As identity is viewed as discursively constituted, foreign policy discourses serve
to inscribe boundaries by demarcating inside from outside, Self from
Other, domestic from foreign - and it is re-inscribed when the distinction
is ambiguous and in need of differentiation (Campbell 1998, 113).3 As discussed
2 The following section draws on Ballbach (2015). 
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above, foreign policy is an important practice of differentiation to demark those
boundaries between the inside and the outside that distinguish the identity in
whose name they operate from counter-identities.4 Seen from this theoretical
perspective it is apparent that the discursive construction of the nuclear state
identity in the DPRK is permeated with constructions of Self and Other(s), with
the boundary produced between the DPRK and the U.S. being particularly sig-
nificant. In fact, the nuclear state identity construction simultaneously essential-
izes North Korean-ness as the binary opposite of U.S.-ness and enumerates
the character of each realm by arguing that the Self is inherently good, moral and
military strong, while the U.S. Other is constructed as an evil, amoral and foreign
enemy (see Ballbach 2015, 147-153). Those figurations of difference based upon
hierarchical orders are an essential element of the North Korean nuclear state
identity. In this context, Campbell (1998, 73) correctly notes that the social space
of inside/outside is both made possible by and helps constitute a moral space of
superior/inferior, which can be animated in terms of any number of figurations
of higher/lower.
THE NUCLEAR STATE IDENTITY AND THE WRITING OF THREAT AND (IN-)
SECURITY
Inherently related to the writing of Self and Other is a second integral character-
istic of the articulation of the DPRK s nuclear state identity: the discursive con-
struction of (in-)security and threat, exemplified by numerous statements and
speeches that describe the DPRK s very existence as being existentially threat-
ened by the hostile policies of foreign forces. While often disregarded by
observers as mere rhetoric, such representations of threat are vitally important to
the construction of North Korea s nuclear state identity for a number of reasons.5
3 Poststructuralism s relational conception of identity implies that identity is always given mean-
ing through (reference to) something it is not: to speak of the Self as moral is to constitute another
identity or set of identities - the Other/s - as amoral. The Other is thus an ontological necessity in
that it is only through its constitution that the Self becomes a meaningful subject (Hansen 2007, 4).
4 As these differentiations are the subject to a particular hierarchical order, through its political
discourses the state creates idealized pictures of Self and Other with which the national is hailed and
the foreign or undesirable is differentiated. The representation of the Other as immoral, for instance,
is not only a necessity to understand the Self as moral, but it furthermore manifests a hierarchical
and undesirable meaning of otherness upon which policies are formulated, legitimized and institu-
tionalized (the disciplining part) (Bormann 2008, 14).
Above all, discourses of danger establish inside/outside boundaries by providing
the North Korean state and people with a sense of who and what they are by
contrasting who or what they are not and what they have to fear. As [d]anger
is not an objective condition (Campbell 1998, 1-2), the North Korean state delib-
erately produces discourses of insecurity that name someone or something as
dangerous, thus normalizing the perception of the U.S. (and other outside forces)
as something the state and people should fear. This is, of course, not to suggest
that there are no actual dangers and military risks involved in the relations
between North Korea and the outside world. However, at least equally important
is the fact that the historically contingent and intentional construction of public
threats continue to surround virtually all official rhetoric about North Korea s
standing in the world, which, in turn, normalize and institutionalize public anxi-
eties (Ryang 2012). The main point here is that, as dangers do not exist indepen-
dently of perception, what is perceived as a threat to the DPRK is therefore a
result of interpretation - and these interpretations must not always correspond to
the realities of the actual risk of harm. North Korea s nuclear discourse thus does
not just designate or identify a pre-existing threat for the Self against which the
state protects it; by naming something as a danger, this discourses co-constitutes
and re-creates the threat in itself, and they inform governmental practices and
actions accordingly (Ballbach 2015, 154). What is particularly important in this
regard is the fact that this process of constructing insecurities is paralleled by pre-
senting the North Korean state as the (only) apposite solution to deal with this
uncertainty (Alvarez 2006, 75). Hence, in the discursive construction of the
nuclear state identity, representations of danger are an essential instrument of
the North Korean state to legitimize the political practices that are said to counter
those threats and thus secure the inside, i.e. the development of nuclear weapons.
Constructions of threat thus constitute an integral part of the discursive con-
struction of the nuclear state identity, as they are a necessity of the state for the
constant (re-)production of danger rather than the state s mere response to dan-
ger (Campbell 1998, 12, 13). We can assess, therefore, that the manifestation of
the North Korean nuclear state identity is at least partially constructed by a dis-
course rooted in threat, danger and fear, and the construction of this threat is
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5 Discourses of danger are important to the DPRK to maintain self/other boundaries and enforce
unity on the domestic scene, to construct fear and (re-)produce anxiety, to maintain quiescence and
de-legitimize dissent, to elevate the status of security actors, to provide the North Korean authorities
with the resources and the legitimacy to divert scarce resources to particular ideologically driven pro-
jects or national efforts or to distract the public from more complex and pressing social ills (such as
the economic and social crises) (Ballbach 2015, 153-155).
integral in constituting and disciplining the North Korean nuclear state identity
as practiced through its foreign policy; it co-constitutes the practices of the
DPRK s nuclear endeavor and makes them appear reasonable and appropriate.
In this sense, threats and dangers are both indispensable and functional to North
Korea s political life (Jackson 2005, 156). It is very possible that without the over-
whelming reality of the U.S. threat, the massive efforts and expenditures that
go along with the nuclear endeavor would be impossible to sustain. Jean
Delumeau s (quoted in Campbell 1998, 80) argument, namely, that while danger
can be and indeed often is experienced negatively, it may also be a creative force,
a call into being that provides access to the world, seems to hold particularly
true for North Korea. The political consequences of such constructions are obvi-
ous, and the challenge for the international community is formidable. Ultimately,
one must ask how we can negotiate away a threat with a country that deems the
related dangers as vital to its very existence?
PERFORMING THE NUCLEAR STATE IDENTITY 
Theorizing identity as performative leads to the assumption that North Korea s
nuclear state identity relies on constant performativity in order to become mean-
ingful. This section therefore discusses the connections of this discursive identi-
ty construction with the articulation of North Korean foreign and security policy.
How, it is asked, is this particular identity trait performatively enacted, or, more
precisely, how do the identifications of the nuclear state identity construction dis-
cussed in the previous section connect to the formulation of North Korean for-
eign and security policy in the context of the nuclear issue ? In order to begin
answering this very complex question, two particular instances of the performa-
tive enactment of North Korea s nuclear state identity are addressed in this sec-
tion: the DPRK s repeated nuclear tests, and the issuance of vital foreign and
security policy doctrines in April 2010 and April 2013, respectively.
PERFORMING A SPECTACLE: 
NORTH KOREA S NUCLEAR TESTS AS PERFORMATIVE ENACTMENTS
OF THE NUCLEAR STATE IDENTITY
North Korea s (thus far) five nuclear tests - on October 9, 2006, on May 25, 2009,
on February 12, 2013, and on January 6 and September 9, 2016 - indisputably are
the most vivid examples of the DPRK s performative enactment of its nuclear
state identity. As the discursive construction of a nuclear weapons state identity
necessitates performative enactment in order to become fully meaningful, the
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nuclear tests serve as the materialization of an identity trait that, until October
2006, was explored only on the discursive level. While observers mostly limit
their debate on the questions of technological success or failure, on the conse-
quences of the tests for the international relations in Northeast Asia, or on the
future of the NPT, among others, most ignore what may be called the performa-
tive significance of the tests. From this perspective, the DPRK s repeated
nuclear tests are about much more than technological and military development,
as important as those are. Rather, from a performative perspective the signifi-
cance of the repeated tests is located in the very act of materializing its (discur-
sively constructed) nuclear state identity through the theatrical staging of foreign
policy. At this point, Kwon and Chung s (2012) discussion of the theater state
concept is crucial. According to these authors, North Korea has turned into mod-
ern theater state, a state directed towards the performance of ritual and specta-
cle in order to execute power on the domestic scene. It is argued elsewhere
(Ballbach 2014) that this perspective is equally relevant to help better understand
North Korean foreign policy. The expression of the theatre state - both domesti-
cally and internally - is the spectacle, which manifests itself in rituals, technolo-
gies, social formations, arguments, speeches, photographs, maps and cultural
productions (cf. Medlicott 2005). Seen from this perspective, the nuclear tests are
intentionally designed as spectacles and constitute a central element in the the-
atrical staging of foreign policy by the international theater state that is North
Korea. They are a performative enactment of North Korea s nuclear state identi-
ty. For instance, following its first nuclear test in October 2006, a foreign ministry
spokesperson termed it inevitable to physically demonstrate the North s
nuclear capacity in order to protect its national sovereignty and existence
(KCNA 2006b, emphasis added). Similarly, the Memorandum of the DPRK
Ministry of Foreign Affairs - The Korean Peninsula and Nuclear Weapons issued
on April 21, 2010, states that only by conducting nuclear tests 
the state of nuclear imbalance in Northeast Asia where nuclear weapons and
nuclear umbrellas were packed and where only the DPRK remained as a nuclear
vacuum zone was brought to an end. By the deterrence effect provided by the
Republic s possession of nuclear weapons, the danger of the outbreak of a war has
noticeably reduced. This is precisely the effort made on the current stage to
remove the nuclear threat not through pleas only in words but by actively deter-
ring the United States nuclear weapons with our nuclear weapons (KCNA
2010, emphasis added). 
Borrowing from Naoko Shimazu (2014, 231), we may argue that the nuclear test
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was an event that became meaningful by the very act of staging it, because it con-
fers a set of symbolic meanings and materializes the nuclear state identity.6 From
this perspective, North Korea s nuclear test was an event that drew attention to
itself because of the heightened sense of perceived importance attached to it by
contemporaries who create information about it and disseminate it - a process
that involves a certain amount of evaluative recognition. As such, North Korea s
repeated nuclear tests were made significant both by the very enactment of North
Korea s nuclear state identity and the reaction to the respective performances.
This point is immediately linked to another important question regarding the
staging of nuclear tests, namely the question of spectators. As every theatrical
staging requires spectators, identifying the audience for which a play is staged
is important. In fact, a constitutive public (konstitutive Offentlichkeit) of perfor-
mative enactments is a basic characteristic of the performative. As Volbers (2011,
146) states, performatives only take full effect if they are perceived and appre-
hended by others. In fact, to Judith Butler, the publicity of performative acts is a
crucial precondition, as the stylization of the body is at the center of the per-
formances. With regard to the DPRK s nuclear tests it is apparent that those
repeated performative acts were staged both for the internal and external audi-
ences. Internally, every nuclear test is accompanied by televised and staged
images that also provide excellent material for the state s powerful propaganda
apparatus. As such, the North Korean discourse is not limited to the realm of for-
eign policy discourses, but it permeates the everyday in North Korea, for instance
in the form of cultural productions. To the external spectators, the televised
images of North Korea s repeated missile and nuclear tests aim at portraying
power and prowess, repeatedly proving to the outside world the DPRK s military
strength and its membership in the very exclusive nuclear club.
INSTITUTIONALIZING IDENTITY: 
ENACTING THE NUCLEAR STATE IDENTITY THROUGH SPECIFIC FOR-
EIGN AND SECURITY POLICY DOCTRINES
A second example of the performative enactment of the nuclear state identity is
the institutionalization of the main elements of this identity trait into authorita-
tive foreign and security policy doctrines. As these doctrines are influential artic-
6 There are a number of different aspects that play into the theatricality and symbolism of the
nuclear tests, beginning with the dates on which they have been conducted. For instance, the third
test was staged on February 12 (2013), the exact day on which U.S. President Barack Obama gave his
important and itself highly symbolic State of the Union address.
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ulations of North Korean intent and practice in the specific field of the nuclear
issue, they are important instances of North Korean foreign and security policy.
Targeting both the domestic audience and the international community, these
documents furnish identity and security narratives and they are, therefore,
performative, constituting a particular order and its corresponding subjects
(Wibben 2011, 39). Hence, these doctrines maintain a mutually constitutive rela-
tion with identity, for they articulate statecraft and thereby reify identity (Wadley
2010, 44). The reading of identity from the respective foreign and security policy
documents, therefore, lays bare the contents of what is actually enacted by these
practices. This is to argue that the identity traits (of Self and Other) and the
constructions of threat that are characteristic for the nuclear state identity con-
struction come into being through the foreign and security practice of the DPRK,
as articulated in the particular doctrine documents and their products. In fact, in
the past years, Kim Jong Un undertook several important steps to institutional-
ize and elevate the DPRK s nuclear status by revising the country s constitution,
passing new laws, and establishing new government organizations with the man-
date to advance the nuclear weapons program. While many aspects of the inter-
nal process of policy formulation with regard to the nuclear issues are informal
and, as such, are not openly traceable, the available security doctrines are all the
more significant. 
On April 21, 2010, and thus almost concurrently with Obama s Nuclear Posture
Review, the DPRK issued its first in-depth statement of nuclear doctrine, the
Memorandum of the DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs - The Korean Peninsula
and Nuclear Weapons. (KCNA 2010). In this statement, North Korea immedi-
ately links its own denuclearization not only to the comprehensive denucleariza-
tion of the Korean peninsula, but also to the necessity of global denuclearization
as well as to the establishment of a solid peace regime on the Korean peninsu-
la. Rephrasing the narrative of defense and once again stressing that the DPRK
is not bound by the NPT and by international law, the statement reads that
[t]he mission of the nuclear forces of the DPRK is to deter and repel aggression
and attack against the country and the nation until the denuclearization of the
Korean peninsula and the world is realized. The DPRK is invariably maintaining
the policy not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states or threaten them
with nuclear weapons as long as they do not join the act of invading or attacking
us in conspiracy with nuclear weapons states (Ibid.).
This statement sheds some light on North Korean s perception of how it under-
stands the deterrence dynamic on the peninsula. North Korea sees its nuclear
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capability as a deterrent against an attempt to overthrow the regime through an
invasion. As the April doctrine puts it, no nation in the world has been exposed
to the nuclear threat so directly and for so long as the Koreans (Ibid.). In short,
it appears the objective of this Memorandum is to present North Korea s nuclear
weapon status to the rest of the world as an irrefutable and justifiable fact, using
the language and rationales traditionally used by most of the other nuclear
weapon states. As such North Korea is now saying that it will keep nuclear
weapons until they are eliminated from the peninsula and the rest of the world
(Ibid.). 
At the fifth session of the 12th SPA, held on April 13, 2012, the DPRK amended
the constitution, adding a reference to the DPRK as a nuclear state
(haekpoyuguk) in the preamble.7 Given that the constitution provides one of the
most basic texts for any country, the constitutional codification of the DPRK as a
nuclear power is a powerful performative act that enshrines identity. The respec-
tive part of the revised preamble reads as follows:
In the face of the collapse of the world socialist system and the vicious offensive
of the imperialist allied forces to stifle the Democratic People s Republic of Korea,
Comrade Kim Jong Il administered Songun politics; thus he safeguarded with
honour the achievements of socialism which are the precious legacy of Comrade
Kim Il Sung, developed the DPRK into an invincible politico-ideological power, a
nuclear state [haekpoyuguk, literally a state with nuclear capability] and an
unchallengeable military power, and opened a broad avenue for the building of a
thriving nation [kangsonggukka].
The preamble is as much about Kim Jong Il s achievements as it is about the
nuclear question per se. The amended preamble eulogizes Kim Jong Il as a patri-
ot without parallel who exalted the dignity of our people and our national power
to supreme status. As was already discussed above, North Korea s political dis-
course fused its nuclear state identity with the legacy of Kim Jong Il, and this dis-
cursive construction was materialized by enshrining it into one of the most pro-
lific texts of any country, the constitution. As such, P yongyang s decision to list
itself as a nuclear state sends a clear message to both internal and external spec-
tators: the DPRK has no intention of giving up its nuclear program. 
7 The original (Korean) text of the constitution can be accessed here:
http://www.naenara.com.kp/ko/great/constitution.php?1. An English translation can be found at:
http://www.naenara.com.kp/en/great/constitution.php?1.
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The seventh session of the 12th SPA, held on March 31, 2013, codified the devel-
opment of nuclear weapons in the DPRK into law by adopting the DPRK Law on
Developing Space, the SPA Decision On Setting Up the DPRK State Space
Development Bureau and the DPRK Law on Consolidating the Position of
Nuclear Weapons State for Self-Defense (Choson Sinbo 2013). On April 1, 2013
it was revealed that an ordinance of the Supreme People s Assembly of the DPRK
had been promulgated. The text states that only by developing an independent
and just nuclear force has the DPRK put an end to the distress-torn history in
which it was subject to outside forces [oese] aggression and interference and
could emerge a socialist power of Chuch e which no one dares provoke. It con-
tinues to stress that [t]he DPRK is a full-fledged nuclear weapons state capable
of beating back any aggressor troops at one strike, firmly defending the socialist
system and providing a sure guarantee for the happy life of the people. The law
addresses ten steps through which to consolidate the position of the nuclear
weapons state, repeating both the narrative of defense and deterrence against
U.S. threat and the stipulation of the DPRK as a responsible nuclear power. Most
importantly, however, is the fact that the document is inherently linked to polit-
ical practice by particular actors and institutions that are ordered to take thor-
ough practical steps for implementing this ordinance. To that end, the DPRK
General Bureau for Atomic Energy was upgraded into the full-fledged Ministry of
Nuclear Power Industry, in accordance with the SPA Presidium Degree No. 3111.
Moreover, when North Korea announced its fifth nuclear test in September 2016,
the missive was delivered by the DPRK s Nuclear Weapons Institute, a previ-
ously unknown institution. According to a press release from North Korea s
embassy in Russia, this decision reflects the DPRK s confidence regarding the
basic completion of nuclear weapons development.
As these examples demonstrate, the performativity of North Korea s nuclear
state identity refers to all those practices that materialize the identity construc-
tions that endow a particular meaning to this specific identity construction.
Hence, the representations of the inherently threatened, yet militarily and moral-
ly strong Self, the narrative of defense and deterrence, and the notions of a
responsible nuclear power with a unique status are all among those aspects that
are performatively enacted and, as such, have become manifested in a set of par-
ticular foreign and security documents.
CONCLUSION 
North Korea s nuclear endeavor is among the most pressing challenges of
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Northeast Asia s regional political order. As such, it is hardly surprising that the
issue has received widespread attention among concerned scholars. However, in
this academic discourse, questions of identity, and how it interrelates to the
DPRK s foreign policy, are all too often overlooked. Yet, incorporating the iden-
tity dimension is crucial to understand fully North Korea s motives and behavior
in the nuclear issue because, to the DPRK, the nuclear program holds significance
well beyond the political-diplomatic, economic, and even military realm. The
nuclear weapons program has become the DPRK s single most important iden-
tity project in the post-Cold War era, and the subsequent conflict over this pro-
gram with (parts of) the international community provides a crucial performative
space to North Korea where the ongoing construction of a nuclear state identity
is further explored and the politics of identity are performed. In this process, a
particular identity trait emerged, labeled here as the nuclear state identity. 
This particular identity trait was scrutinized on two levels, namely, the discur-
sive level, and the level of performative enactment/ materialization. The article
firstly traced the emergence and development of this identity trait in North
Korean post-Cold War era foreign policy discourses, arguing that this particular
identity trait was not constituted and materialized through a single founding act.
Rather, North Korea s nuclear state identity was gradually brought into being by
the citational practices of performativity. As such, North Korea s nuclear pro-
gram comes into effect and is potentiated as an acceptable and appropriate mea-
sure for defending the threatened Self against specifically identified Other(s) -
primarily the U.S. - within the framework and scope of specific foreign policy dis-
courses. Within this discursive framework, the construction of the nuclear state
identity emerged as one of the most significant identity traits of North Korea s
state identity in the post-Cold War era. The study then analyzed two main char-
acteristics of the nuclear state identity construction, namely, the writing of Self
and Other, and the construction of threats and dangers as vital elements of this
particular identity construction. Moving from the discursive level of the nuclear
state identity to its actual materialization, the study proceeded with an analysis
of the performative enactment of this particular identity trait. In this context, two
examples of this performative enactment were discussed, namely, the repeated
nuclear tests, and two vital security doctrines as particular instances of the per-
formative enactment of the nuclear state identity. These doctrines are important,
for they codified particular (discursive) identifications concerned with the
DPRK s nuclear state status, which then serve as a frame of reference for the
DPRK s foreign and security policies.
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